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Due to this downward and upward shift of incomes, the middle income groups have been hollowed out. While these still constituted a good 63% of all employees in 1995, they had lost over 11 percentage points by 2006, a share that then went to the upper and especially the lower end of the income distribution (Table 1) .
Between 1995 and 2006, average real incomes in Germany hardly increased, due to insignifi cant growth of income as a whole. When the pie to be shared barely grows, accompanied by increasingly uneven distribution, one segment of the workforce can be expected to lose real and maybe even nominal income -a phenomenon that could in fact be observed since 1995. In the lowest quartile, real wages have shrunk by almost 14% since 1995. They also decreased in the second quartile, albeit less signifi cantly, while they rose in both upper quartiles (Table 2) . Between 2000 and 2006, the lower quartile even saw a drop in nominal wages, i.e. absolute wages shrunk beneath the level of 2000. The income redistribution thus hit the lowest wage groups the hardest, although real wage losses did reach into the middle income groups. In 2006, the lowest quartile earned, with €6.88, on average 35 cents per hour less than only six years previously. The nominal wage loss was 4.8% and the real wage loss even 13.7%. At the same time in France, the minimum wage rose from €6.41 to €8.27, thus by nearly 30%. It is thus not surprising that articles with titles such as "Frankreich: Ein Vorbild für Deutschland?" (France: A Model for Germany?) 2 are being published even though Germany had served as a model for France in previous years.
The number of low wage workers in Germany grew from about 4.5 million (1995) to approximately 6.5 million (2006), i.e. by 2 million or a good 43%. This growth persisted even between 2004 and 2006, namely by some 700 000 workers, thus during an economic upswing when wages normally increase even in the lower sectors. This increasing prevalence of low wages 2 G. H o r n , H. J o e b g e s , C. L o g e a y, S. S t u r n : Frankreich: Ein Vorbild für Deutschland? Ein Vergleich wirtschaftspolitischer Strategien mit und ohne Mindestlohn, in: IMK Report No. 63, Düsseldorf 2008. G ermany has long been considered a country with comparably little wage dispersion and few low paid employees. Only several years ago, an intense debate arose as to whether a low wage sector should be introduced in order to promote employment as a whole and in particular for low-skilled workers. However, a low wage sector has always existed in Germany, although it remained stable for a long time at approximately 13% to 14%. In the mid-1990s, the low wage sector began growing -at fi rst rather inconspicuously, though forcefully just the same -without bringing improvements for overall employment or for the low-skilled workforce. The Hartz reforms were furthermore a deliberate political move to spur the growth of low wage employment, a growth with seemingly no end in sight.
In France and Denmark, the percentage of low wage workers -measured as the proportion of employed who earn less than two thirds of the median hourly wage -has remained relatively low for years, in international comparison. In Germany, however, the share of low wage workers has reached the level of the UK, while the country's gap to the United States has decreased (Figure 1 ).
In the following we fi rst outline the development of the low wage sector and its structure, followed by an examination of its causes. In conclusion, we summarise the current debate on low wages.
Development and Structure of Low Wage Employment in Germany
In Germany, the gap between high and low incomes has steadily widened since 1995.
1 A simple comparison of the infl ation-adjusted income distribution of the years 1995, 2000 and 2006 shows a signifi cant fl attening of the income distribution curve, with strong losses in the middle and an increase at the lower and upper ends. Striking is also the strong increase of employment in the lowest wage sector (gross hourly wages below €6 at 1995 prices and below €7 at 2006 prices). Furthermore, since Germany has no general minimum wage, the downward spread of wages is particularly pronounced. In 2006, some 1.9 million workers in Germany were working for hourly wages below €5, i.e. for signifi cantly less (in absolute terms and relative to the respective median) than in France or the Netherlands, where the statutory minimum wages lie above €8.
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In 1995, full-time employees comprised the clear majority of the low wage workforce with a proportion of roughly 58%; by 2006, however, that proportion had sunk to 46%. Accordingly, the share of part-time workers or those who hold so-called "mini jobs" within the low wage workforce rose to some 54% (Table  3) , although their share within the overall workforce constitutes only 29.5%. Mini jobs are jobs that are restricted to an earning limit of €400 per month and for which workers receive no social insurance benefi ts. The employer still has to pay a fl at rate of 30% into the social security fund, which roughly equals the social insurance contributions he/she would normally make for employees. Moreover, holders of mini jobs are offi cially entitled to the same labour protection and the same hourly wages as comparable employees who are subject to social insurance contributions. The in-tention of such restrictions is to keep mini jobs from becoming the preferred form of employing labour from the employers' point of view. In practice, however, the mini job sector has come to constitute an employment form in which these rights are often denied. It is customary, for example, that holders of mini jobs do not get paid for vacations, public holidays or sick days. The proportion of mini jobs increased particularly in the low wage sector, nearly doubling between 1995 and 2006. That increase is attributable above all to the increasing proportion of mini jobs in employment as a whole, which nearly tripled from 2.6% in 1995 to 7.1% in 2006.
However, the decline in the share of full-time employees in the low wage sector does not mean that these were less affected by low wages in 2006 than in 1995. On the contrary: whereas in 1995 every ninth full-time employee worked for a low wage, it was every seventh in 2006 (Table 4) .
Many consider the expansion of the low wage sector necessary in order to give low-skilled workers, otherwise excluded from the job market, employment 
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opportunities at all. Our evaluations confi rmed that low-skilled workers are in fact affected by low wages to an over-proportional and increasing degree: the low wage portion of this group of the workforce rose by some 49% between 1995 and 2006. At the same time, however, the growth rate, at nearly 70%, was significantly higher in the distinctly larger group of employees who have vocational or professional qualifi cations (Table 5) .
A look at the structure of low wage work based on employment profi les (Table 6) shows that in 2006 only one quarter of all low wage workers in Germany were low-skilled. The percentage of employees with a vocational training qualifi cation or academic degree among low wage workers rose signifi cantly from 1995 to 2006, namely from 66.5% to 73.6%. Thus, almost three out of four low wage workers in Germany qualify as skilled workers -a value considered extremely high even in international comparison. By contrast, in the United States some 70% of the low wage workforce has no vocational qualifi cation or only a high school degree, i.e. an educational level below that of a completed apprenticeship in Germany. 4 This marked difference in the qualifi cation profi le of the low wage work force can be attributed, in part, to the prolonged period of high unemployment in Germany, under which even highly qualifi ed workers are pressured to take on low paid labour. On the other hand, the low-skilled workforce in Germany is relatively small in international comparison due to the country's well-developed vocational education and training system.
Causes of the Increase in Social Inequality in Germany
How could such a rapid increase of low and even "rock bottom" wages have happened in a social market economy such as Germany? We see the main culprit in the vulnerability of Germany's collective wage system to outside competition. Given that there is no binding minimum wage -either through a statutory minimum wage or through collective wage agreements that apply pan-nationally for a specifi c sector -it is possible that wages drop below the standard industry wages. Up until German unifi cation, however, this played only a subordinate role. Some 80% of companies were bound to wage agreements and the unions were strong. The non-wage-bound businesses used the wage agreements as a guideline in order to prevent their human resources from going elsewhere or their company from becoming the target of union actions. However, these fears vanished with the high unemployment after reunifi cation. First in Eastern Germany and then also West Germany, many businesses left the employers' associations or chose not to join them in the fi rst place in order to be able to pay lower wages.
The low wage sector that began growing in the mid1990s had a domino effect even on businesses that were well unionised. The growing wage differential within the economy increasingly offered incentives to shift formerly well-paid activities into sectors and businesses that pay lower wages. This development was strongly promoted through political interventions. Outside competition received a strong impetus from the change in European competition regulations. With the EU freedom-of-services provisions, people can be sent to work in Germany under the wage conditions of their home country. The construction industry is the only sector in which generally binding minimum wages were agreed upon as early as the mid-1990s, pursuant to Germany's 1996 Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz). In other sectors, however, such as the meat industry, domestic workers who were already very low paid have been replaced by even lower paid contractors. 5 Even more far-reaching impacts resulted from the EU directives on the opening of markets for products and services formerly provided by the state (e.g. postal, telecommunications, or commuter transit sector). In most other European countries, new suppliers of such services have to comply to generally binding collective agreements; in Germany, however, they can pay any wage that clears the market. This invites companies to adopt business models that are no longer based on innovation but on wage dumping, as has been observed in the postal services sector for example.
A further political impetus was given by the Hartz reforms, implemented by the red-green government in 2003. In particular three statutory changes increased the downward pressure on wages. First, as of 2004, long-term unemployed persons receive only a standard minimum amount of €345 per month, with single-person households receiving an additional rent subsidy. Before, this segment of the unemployed received income-dependent unemployment assistance. The change increased the pressure on skilled longterm unemployed persons, who had earned well before, to take on poorly paid jobs. Second, the removal of time-limits for assignments of temporary agency workers gave companies the possibility to replace long-standing staff with lower paid temporary agency workers on a permanent basis. The legal obligation to provide temporary agency workers with equal pay, intended to curb such practices, proved ineffective in Germany, unlike in France, because temporary employment agencies in Germany veered from this principle by concluding collective wage agreements that undercut the rate of that equal pay. Numerous collective wage agreements for temporary agency work are now in effect with hourly wages signifi cantly below the low wage threshold as well as signifi cantly lower than standard negotiated wages in typical sectors, in particular for workers taking on temporary work for the fi rst time.
6 Third, we must mention the signifi cant raising of the upper earning limit for mini-jobs from €325 to €400 per month and the lifting of the former maximum of 15 hours per week.
Especially in the service sectors, such as retail or hospitality, many full-time or part-time jobs, which are subject to social insurance contributions, were restructured into mini-jobs to the benefi t of the employer. This has affected women in particular. Concerning temporary agency labour, the number of temporary agency workers, mostly men, rose from some 330 
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000 in 2003 to more than 820 000 in August 2008. 7 A good part of this additional temporary agency labour was hired by high wage sectors, such as the metal industry, where sometimes entire production lines were run by temporary agency workers at lower hourly wages. Admittedly, many temporary agency workers have been dismissed in the current crisis. The sector is, however, very optimistic. Ludger Hinsen, CEO of a federal employers' association for temporary work (Bundesverband Zeitarbeit Personal-Dienstleistungen), said, "As paradoxical as it sounds, the crisis is opening many opportunities for the temporary work sector […] This is because many potential client businesses now realise how important it is to be fl exible and to work with temporary staff -now in the crisis but especially afterwards". 8 The changes in Germany can best be understood when looking at the overall structure of the wage forming institutions and comparing it with that of other countries. Figure 2 shows the structure of these institutions in six different countries, and how in three of these countries (FR, DK, NL) a high degree of collective wage coverage and stability was achieved. In France and the Netherlands, considerable wage coverage was achieved less through a high density of unions than through a high organisation rate of companies and the generally binding nature of collective agreements. These two countries have de facto two types of minimum wages: the statutory minimum wage as the lowest threshold, and the generally binding collective agreements, the wages of which mostly lie above the minimum wage. In Denmark, the high wage coverage is a result of, especially, the high degree of unionisation. Employers' associations and unions have also agreed on a minimum wage of €13.80, and have been able to comply with this agreement without government assistance. 9 In all three countries, wage competition is successfully limited through effective minimum wage thresholds.
In Germany, the coverage through collective wage agreements dropped to 65% of all employees in West Germany and even to 54% in East Germany in 2006, especially due to companies resigning from employ-ers' associations or to newly founded companies not joining the associations in the fi rst place. This led to the formation of a large unregulated labour market segment with low wages alongside the classical German collective wage model. To save expenses, many companies bound to collective wage agreements began outsourcing activities to smaller and mediumsized companies that are not bound to those agreements. Most of these smaller and medium-sized companies have no workers' councils, which, given their co-determination rights, generally function as watchdogs for wage dumping. In specifi c service sectors with a lower rate of organisation on the employer side as well as the union side, such as retail, coverage through collective wage standards had been ensured in many small and medium-sized companies primarily through a declaration of general applicability. For many years now, however, employers' associations are refusing to give their consent to the general applicability and binding nature of collective wage agreements. The German collective wage institutions have thus become highly unstable due to this nearly unrestricted wage dumping.
In the United States and United Kingdom, the unregulated zones without collective wage agreements are even bigger as wage agreements are concluded almost exclusively at the company level. The few industry-wide collective wage agreements in effect in the private sector in United Kingdom in the 1980s (e.g. engineering industry), as well as in the United States (e.g. for truck drivers), did not survive the wage competition. It must be mentioned that those countries nevertheless have minimum wages to fall back on, although those are very low in the United States.
The Debate over Minimum Wages in Germany
Up until only a few years ago, minimum wages were a topic of discussion only in the German construction industry. This sector had increasingly employed workers from southern, central, and eastern Europe at the wages of their home countries. The low wages not only undercut the collective wage agreements but also distorted competition between companies. Unions and employers in construction then agreed on industry-wide minimum wages and, in 1996, pushed these through against harsh resistance from the employers' umbrella associations. According to the above-mentioned Posted Workers Law (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz), these minimum wages then also apply to workers from other EU countries who are sent to work on construction sites in Germany by their companies.
Up until recently, the construction sector was considered an exception to the rule. Unions, employers' associations, and political parties agreed that wages for other industries should be negotiated exclusively by the respective partners and that the state should not intervene. This consensus fell apart when it became clear that the collective wage system was no longer in the position to set effective minimum standards for the various industries. First, the unions representing the low wage sectors advocated a minimum wage. This was initially resisted by the strong industry unions, who feared that this would push wages below their negotiated collective wages. However, they fi nally consented to the demand for a minimum wage in May 2006. The SPD and the Greens then did an about-face: still promoting the expansion of the low wage sector by means of the Hartz reforms in 2003, they, in 2005, at the end of their shared term and prior to the Bundestag elections, began demanding a general minimum wage. The employers and conservative parties (CDU/CSU and FDP), for their part, oppose minimum wages to this day with the argument that this causes the loss of jobs. In the meantime, however, more than two thirds of Germans support the introduction of a minimum wage, among them signifi cant majorities of voters of the conservative parties.
The grand coalition (2005 -2009) failed, due to the different positions of the two ruling parties, to agree on a general minimum wage on the basis of the British or French model. Instead, minimum wages were to be determined for separate industries. To achieve this, the grand coalition agreed upon a choice of two mechanisms:
One, employers and unions can conclude collective wage agreements for their respective minimum wages. If these agreements cover 50% of employees and are concluded at the national level, the state can declare them generally applicable and binding on the basis of the Posted Workers Law. However, these conditions were met only by some sectors (e.g. construction industry and cleaning industry). At the same time, other sectors with a high proportion of low wages, such as the meat industry, have no country-wide collective wage negotiation mechanism in place, with the result that such agreements cannot be concluded. Moreover, further sectors such as temporary work are characterised by competing collective wage agreements with different minimum wage levels. Moreover, the Christian unions, i.e. employer-friendly "yellow unions" with few members, are ready to undercut collective agreements of the other unions belonging to the German confederation of trade unions (DGB). Through such actions by organisations that should not qualify as true unions (they violate confl ict-of-interest laws and have no negotiating power) collective wage autonomy is being hollowed out in the lower wage sector.
The second mechanism was to result from a reform of the 1952 Minimum Working Conditions Act (Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz). With such a reform, minimum standards could be determined, on demand, for industry sectors that do not fulfi l the abovementioned conditions. The procedure foresees that a steering committee (Hauptausschuss), composed of two representatives each from unions, employers' associations, and science as well as one independent chairperson investigate whether a sector is characterised by social rifts to the extent that minimum wages seem necessary. If the steering committee determines such a need, an expert committee of representatives of the employers and unions of the respective sector is created that can agree on a minimum wage that can then be declared generally applicable. In both committees, an independent chairperson would have the authority to break stalemates and tie votes.
By early September 2009, minimum wages had been negotiated for a total of 9 sectors comprising some 1,849 million employees based on the fi rst mechanism. Usually, different wages were determined for East and West Germany. Several further sectors (continuing education, security services, care services) have since applied for minimum wages. The 
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number of employees actually benefi ting from a minimum wage in these fi elds is not known. No minimum wages have yet been set via the second mechanism, as the reform of the Minimum Working Conditions Act was always procrastinated by the CDU/CSU, with the effect that the steering committee did not meet for the fi rst time until September 2009, shortly before the federal elections.
This complex system of regulations provides numerous possibilities for politics, employers and competing unions to block its practical application. Minimum wages are thus very slow to come about and we can expect, rather, a patchwork of different minimum wages and large unregulated zones without a binding minimum wage. Unlike in the UK or France, there is no self-enforcing effect by means of a simple structure. For this reason, employees in Germany cannot be expected to even know the respective minimum wage to which they are entitled or how to get that minimum wage enforced. The inspection authorities would be unable to cope, as poorly paid jobs would be shifted to non-regulated areas. The social project to stop sweatshop wages ("Vermeidung von Ausbeuterlöh-nen"), which is enjoying great popularity, would possibly become delegitimised because minimum wages cannot be implemented in all sectors and, even if they were, compliance to those wages cannot be ensured.
To stop this development and to prevent further growth of the low wage sector, politics must take a different direction. What is needed is a uniform minimum wage that is applicable to all sectors. This minimum wage could then be amended with a second set of collectively agreed sector wages, as in France or the Netherlands. However, a broader reform package would also demand obligatory social insurance contributions for mini jobs as well as equal pay for temporary agency workers.
The new German government does not wish to embark on this path. The coalition agreement of the new government states the following with regard to the keyword "wage autonomy / statutory minimum wage": "The CDU, CSU, and FDP profess their commitment to wage bargaining autonomy. It is a valuable good, is an indispensable part of the social market economy, and is to have precedence over state-regulated wagesetting. We are opposed to a standard statutory minimum wage. For this reason, we wish to strengthen the collective bargaining committee to emphasise the obligation of employers and employees to negotiate wage agreements. The cabinet will mutually decide on the declaration of collective wage agreements as generally binding. A basic condition for this is a majority in the collective bargaining committee. An evaluation of the existing legal regulations concerning minimum wages will be completed by October 2011. The focus will be on the question as to whether these regulations threaten jobs or hinder the creation of new jobs. We shall also examine whether they ensure both the required protection of employees and the competitiveness of the different industry sectors. The results of this evaluation will serve as the basis for the decision on whether the existing minimum wage laws should be maintained or abolished. The evaluation will wait until the pending proceedings of the German federal court concerning the minimum wage for postal workers have ended." (p. 21; our translation). 
